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ABSTRACT
Why did states dominate investments in economic development in early America? Between 1787
and 1860, the national government’s $54 million on promoting transportation infrastructure while
the states spent $450 million. Using models of legislative choice, we show that Congress could not
finance projects that provided benefits to a minority of districts while spreading the taxes over all.
Although states faced the same political problems, they used benefit taxation schemes  ￿ for
example, by assessing property taxes on the basis of the expected increase in value due to an
infrastructure investment. The U.S. Constitution prohibited the federal government from using
benefit taxation. Moreover, the federal government’s expenditures were concentrated in collections
small projects  ￿ such as lighthouses and rivers and harbors  ￿ that spent money in all districts.











1Government expenditures in total were a small part of total income in the early
nineteenth century, on the order of 5 percent of national income [Wallis, 2000].  Between 1800
and 1860 the total federal expenditures, including war expenditures, were $1,673 million.  State
and local transportation expenditures were fully one quarter of total federal expenditures.
1. Introduction
American governments devoted substantial resources to promoting economic development
before the Civil War. The United States was an agrarian economy with millions of acres of
virgin land.  Economic growth required investment in transportation (roads, canals, and
railroads) to open frontier land to markets and in banks to finance shipment of goods to markets.
Governments financed both financial institutions and large-scale internal improvements
[Callender 1903, Goodrich 1960, North 1966, Taylor 1968, Larson 2001].  
The puzzle is that state, not the national, governments played the central role as
promoters of development. Indeed, state financial efforts were nearly an order of magnitude
larger than the federal government’s. Between 1790 and 1860, the federal government spent $60
million on transportation improvements, while state and local governments spent over $450
million.
1  Every American is a citizen of both a state and the United States. Given the demand for
public goods to promote development, why did the states and not the national government supply
these public goods?
Several other aspects of early America make the contrast more puzzling. First, the
national government should be more efficient provider of infrastructure. The nation as a whole is
better able to spread the risks of such an investment than an individual state, an explanation often
used to justify the modern leadership of the national government in economic policy.  Second,
the national government typically ran a budget surplus in peacetime before 1860, so fiscal2 Wallis and Weingast
2Federal government finances were tight during the 1790s and during the War of 1812. In
1815 the national debt was $137 million; by 1835 it was paid off completely. In the 1820s,
annual federal revenues averaged $22 million and expenditures only $16 million; in the 1830s,
$30 million and $24 million. Historical Statistics of the United States.
constraints played a limited role in the national government’s failure to provide these market-
enhancing public goods.
2
Our specific puzzle is related to a third issue. The national Constitution created a
government of limited powers, including a strong system of federalism, a system that pitted
“ambition against  ambition.”  Did the incentives facing public officials limit their ability to
exercise political power? 
To address these questions, we model the political economy of a legislature facing the
choice of funding a large infrastructure investment. The model has three related results. First, the
political constraints inherent in majority rule prevented the federal government from financing
large infrastructure projects. Large projects provided geographically highly concentrated benefits
with diffuse costs. Because such projects increased taxation everywhere, they made most areas
of the country worse off and so could not command a majority of votes. Although logrolling was
possible, in practice the scale of infrastructure investments like the Erie Canal limited logrolling
because only a few could be built at once. 
Second, two separate political forces pushed Congress toward financing large collections
of smaller projects – such as lighthouses, roads, or dredging harbors – distributed across the
entire country. We term these large collections “universalism,” or “something for everyone.”
Coalitional politics push toward universalism [Weingast 1979].  When members of Congress are
uncertain about what winning coalition that will form, a universal coalition provides higher3 Federal Impotence
expected returns to each district and its representative than narrower majority coalitions. The
second force, the exit constraint -- the idea that states would leave the Union if federal policies
left them significantly worse off -- also pushed toward universalism. As we note below, exit was
a serious threat in early America: southern states seceded in 1861. The exit constraint implies
that narrow majority coalitions, especially regional ones, risk secession by the areas locked out
of power.  Universalism emerged as the natural solution to both the majority constraint and the
exit constraint.
Third, we show that benefit, or Lindahl, taxation provided another solution to these
political constraints. If the government can tax each locality or state in proportion to the benefits
it receives from the project, then regions outside the area benefitting from the project pay no
taxes and so will not oppose it. The Constitution prohibits the federal government – but not the
states – from using benefit taxation to finance projects: it requires that federal direct taxes be
assessed among the states on the basis of population. 
These results explain the puzzles noted above. The state and national governments
persistently financed development projects in different ways. The Constitutional prohibition on
benefit taxation combines with the logic of congressional politics to imply that the federal
government could not finance large projects. To the extent that the national government financed
transportation investment, it did so through something for everyone programs.  In contrast, states
financed large projects using benefit taxes, assessing property owners in proportion to their
expected economic gains from the new project. This mechanism allowed them to solve the same
political problems that plagued the national government.4 Wallis and Weingast
Finally, these results bear on our larger question about the incentives for how limits on
the power of the national government operated in early America. The Constitution created a
series of political constraints that made it politically impossible for the federal government to
finance large infrastructure projects. Federal efforts came either in form of financing large
collections of small projects or formal allocation formulas to distribute funds to every state. In
short, the national government was politically impotent with respect to the provision of the
highest valued infrastructure projects.
  Section 2 of the paper develops the theory of legislative choice and derives our results
about state and federal policy decisions. Sections 3 and 4 apply these results to the antebellum
era’s national and state programs to finance economic development. Sections 5 and 6 consider
federal policy in more detail. Section 7 discusses the implications of our approach to address the
question of why the federal government grew so much in the twentieth century. 
2. A Theory of Legislative Choice and Infrastructure Investment
We turn to the theory of legislative choice to understand the three phenomena to be explained:
the federal government’s inability to promote economic development through financing large
infrastructure projects; its ability to finance many small projects; and why the states were not
plagued by the same problems.
Today we think of the president as the national leader, the source of most major
legislative initiatives. Yet this is a product of the twentieth century.  In the nineteenth century,5 Federal Impotence
3This discuss draws on modern theories of congressional decisionmaking, particularly in
a historical context. See, e.g., Aldrich [1995], Cox and McCubbins [1993,2005], Krehbiel
[1994], Polsby [2004], Rohde [1991], Schickler [2001], Stewart [2001], Shepsle [1989],
Weingast and Marshall [1988].
4In what follows, we adapt the models in Inman [1988], Shepsle and Weingast [1984] and
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen [1981].  It is quite possible that the perceived costs and benefits
of programs will differ at the national and state level because of externalities, both positive and
negative.  We abstract from those concerns in this paper.
Congress was at the center stage of national legislation. All the famous compromises that revised
aspects of the American national framework and helped sustain the United States were
negotiated and written in Congress, including those of 1820, 1833, 1850, and 1877.  
We consider those nineteenth century policies which sought to spend revenue to build
transportation links: roads, canals and, later, railroads, as wells as rivers and harbors projects and
lighthouses.  The model applies to both the American federal and state governments, so we talk
about generic legislatures and districts, rather than states, districts, or counties.  Both Congress
and state legislatures are geographically oriented.
3  Because legislators are elected from specific
geographic constituencies their electoral incentives force them to concern themselves about the
incidence of policies on their district. Although national or statewide interests matter, it is
primarily the effects of policies on their district that determine whether a given member favors a
policy [Stewart 2002].
Consider an expenditure policy to provide a public good, π(x) = (P1(x), P2(x), ... , Pn(x))
where n is the number of districts, π(x) is a public policy, and the Pi(x) represent the incidence of
the policy on district i.
4 The various functions are written as a function of x, a scale factor that
reflects the size of the policy.6 Wallis and Weingast
5For simplicity, we treat all costs as tax costs, but clearly the costs and benefits to
constituents and legislators can come in many forms.
6Each legislator i has an ideal policy of xi* which solves the problem max Pi(x) and
which occurs when the marginal benefits to district i equals the districts costs, i.e., biN(x) =
tiCN(x).
Pi(x) can be broken into the benefits, bi(x), and costs, ci(x), where Pi(x) = bi(x) - ci(x). We
assume that the benefits are concave and the costs are convex as a function of x; that is, biN> 0,
biO<0, and ciN>0 and ciO > 0 œi.  
The total net social benefits for the state is represented as:
Z(x) = 3i Pi(x) = 3i (bi(x) - ci(x)).
The economically efficient policy, x*, is such that at x*, ZN = 0 and ZO < 0 so that at x* the
marginal net social benefits are zero; i.e.,  3i (biN(x) - ciN(x)) = 0.  Legislative outcomes are
unlikely to meet this criteria, however.
Let C = 3i ci(x) be the total costs of the project, and let T be the total taxes needed to
finance the project. We assume a balanced budget constraint, so that T = C.  Further, district i’s
tax share is ti, so that its tax cost for a particular project is tiC.
5 
District i’s legislator’s objective function is Pi(x) = bi(x) - tiC(x).
6  Legislators consult
only their own objective function, ignoring the effects of the project on other districts, and hence
the project’s social implications.  When choosing between two projects, or between building a
particular project and not, each legislator supports the alternative that provides higher net
benefits. Moreover, we assume a convention about indifference: if a legislator’s district bears no7 Federal Impotence
7All voting models require an assumption about what happens when a legislator is
indifferent between two alternatives.
8Given a single dimensional policy choice, such as the choice over the scale of a single
project, the majority rule equilibrium is the ideal policy of the median district. Standard results
show that, except in very special circumstances, no majority rule equilibrium exists when the
legislature chooses the scale of many projects simultaneously.  These concepts are defined in
Hinich and Munger [1997], Shepsle and Bonchek [1997], and Stewart [2002].  
costs for a project, she votes in favor even if her district receives no benefits.
7 It is clearly
costless for such a legislator to do so.
Legislatures are constrained in two ways.  First, passage of individual legislation is only
possible if a majority of legislators benefit from the proposed legislation.
8  This majority rule
constraint applies to individual pieces of legislation.  Logrolling makes it possible to fund
individual projects (as opposed to legislation) that benefit a minority of legislators, as long as the
project is paired with enough other projects that a majority of legislators receive positive net
benefits from the entire package.  For simplicity, the majority rule constraint requires that all of
the necessary logrolls be bundled into one bill.
Second, the exit constraint applies to the aggregate of all legislation passed by the
legislature.  At the national level, every state must receive positive net benefits from the sum of
all legislation passed, or it “exits.” The exit constraint requires that no district is hurt, on balance,
by the aggregate actions of the government.  Threats of exit were common in the early United
States. Threats to secede or dramatically weaken the union occurred with the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions (1798), the Hartford Convention (1815), the Nullification Crisis (1832-8 Wallis and Weingast
9Schlesinger [1922] shows that every state had some secessionist movement prior to the
Civil War. See Hendrickson [2003] for a recent treatment of forces leading to disunion in the
early nation.
33), and the sectional crises of 1819-20 (over Missouri), 1846-50 (over the Mexican Cession),
and 1854-61 (following the Kansas-Nebraska Act), which resulted in the Civil War.
9 
The exit constraint requires that:
'IPij(x) > 0 (summed over j policies, œi ).
We will return to consider the historical relevance of both the majority and the exit constraint
later.  With respect to states, mobile factors of capital and labor will leave the state if some
region is a permanent minority that receives too little benefits in comparisons with its taxes.
The legislature must make simultaneous decisions about the size of the project, the
allocation of benefits across districts, and the allocation of tax burdens across districts.  We
characterize legislative outcomes under four different mechanisms of public finance: normal
taxation, benefit taxation, universalism or something for everyone, and taxless finance.  These
categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they exhaustive, but they give us a framework to
discuss the choice set facing Congress and the state legislatures in the early 19
th century.  We
continue to consider one big project, like the Erie canal.
A. One large project: Normal taxation.  Normal taxes are the general revenue
instruments already in use by the government.  In the case of the federal government in the early
19
th century, financing expenditures by normal taxation involved revenue from import duties, the
national government’s principal tax.
Large projects have several relevant characteristics. First, they require very large
expenditures relative to the budget, implying that at most only one or two such projects can be9 Federal Impotence
built at once.  Second, these projects concentrate the benefits in a small geographic area while
spreading the tax costs across the entire polity. This implies that some districts receive large
benefits relative to their tax cost: bi(x*) > tiC(x*); but many districts receive no benefits while
bearing their tax cost: Pi(x) < 0 œx>0, since bi(x) = 0 while tiC(x) > 0. 
The concentration of benefits in a few districts implies that most districts pay taxes while
receiving no benefits. These districts both naturally oppose the project and comprise a majority,
so the majority rule constraint implies that no project is built. The size of the project makes it
impossible to find enough logrolling options to compensate districts that do not gain from the
large project.  Even if it is possible to find a project that benefits a majority of districts, a simple
majority fails to meet the exit constraint.  In short, it is difficult for government to build a large,
expensive, geographically concentrated project through normal taxation.
B. One large project: Benefit taxation. The first result assumed that the financial costs
of the project were spread across the state through general taxation. Suppose instead that the
project could be financed by a tax scheme, benefit taxes, also known as Lindahl taxes. In this
scheme, district i’s tax share is a function of the benefits it receives from the project. 
Let the B(x) = 3i bi(x) be the project’s total benefits. Define a benefit taxation scheme so
that ti = bi/B. Under this tax scheme, districts that receive no benefits from the project also pay
no taxes regardless of the project’s total cost: bi = 0 implies that ti = 0/B = 0. Districts pay their
share in taxes in proportion to the benefits they receive. 10 Wallis and Weingast
10To see that bi > tiC under benefit taxation, substitute on the right hand side: tiC =
(bi/B)C = (C/B)bi. Since C/B < 1, the first inequality holds.
11The federal government levied a property tax in 1799, 1814, and 1862, but since the tax
had to be allocated between states on the basis of population, it could not be allocated on the
basis of benefits as measured in increased wealth or property values.
As long as the project’s total benefits exceed the total costs (B > C), each district with
positive benefits also has positive net benefits after paying their tax share.
10 Thus, assuming that
representatives who are indifferent to the project – including legislators whose districts receive
no benefits but also incur no costs – vote in favor of the project, every legislator (weakly) favors
the project, so it will pass. In contrast to the case where projects are financed out of general
revenue, benefit taxation implies that, even in the case of a large project like the Erie canal, most
districts receive no benefits and incur no costs, and so they can costlessly support the project. 
The widespread use of the property tax provided states with a potential mechanism for
creating a benefit tax.  When the value of transportation improvements is capitalized in land
values and property taxes are used to fund construction, it is possible for every district to, at
worst, be indifferent to the large project.  The use of benefit taxation to finance a single large
project simultaneously satisfies the majority and exit constraints.  
The central problem with a single large project is the inability to balance off the losses to
districts that do not benefit from the project because the government is unable to afford multiple
large projects.  Benefit taxation solves that problem.  The Constitution, however, explicitly
prohibited the federal government from using benefit taxation: “Representation and direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included in this Union, according to
their respective Numbers...” (Article 1, Section 2).
1111 Federal Impotence
12Taxless finance is considered in greater detail in Wallis, 2005, “Constitutions,
Corporations, and Corruption.”
13Canals required eminent domain and banks required limited liability and, often, the
privilege of note issue.
C. One large project: Taxless finance. There are several alternatives to financing a
project through taxes.  These financing schemes share a common element: building the project
does not entail raising current taxes, thus taxless finance.
12  Suppose the canal is expected to
generate a stream of toll revenues, but its construction requires government assistance in the
form of eminent domain, limited liability, and financial assistance.
13 The government could
charter a company, creating the special privileges, and then use the good faith and credit of the
government to secure operating capital by issuing bonds.  The government then invests the
borrowed funds in the private corporation by purchasing stock.  Dividends from the
government’s investment are expected cover the government’s interests costs.  Taxpayer’s
liability in this case were contingent on the success of the project.  If the project succeeded, the
government received a steady flow of dividends, net of interest costs, allowing it to lower taxes. 
If the project failed, the government and its taxpayers would assume the debt service.  The First
and Second Banks of the United States were financed in this manner.
A second method of taxless finance was used extensively by the federal government: land
grants.  In these schemes, the federal government would give project promoters grants of federal
land, in alternating strips along the right of way.  Project promoters could sell their land to raise
funds.  Federal lands were an important source of federal revenue, and the idea was that
taxpayers would gain from the grant by raising land values on the land the federal government
did not give away.  The rise in land values would offset the loss of land revenue from the grant. 12 Wallis and Weingast
14By 1830, states were able to draw on 40 years of experience with investment in banks,
with the expectation that “M” was positive and large, and that the probability of a successful
investment, “s,” was close to one.  Canal investments in New York and Ohio had also proven
Federal land values had to more than double for this to happen.  Grants were made to Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois in the 1820s, and the Union and Central Pacific Railroads in the 1860s.
Taxless finance works politically because of the implicit benefit received by all districts. 
Current taxes may not rise, but taxpayers do assume an expected, contingent liability:
CLi = tiC(x)(1-s)
where s is the ex ante probability of project success.  If the project fails ex post, CLi will be
positive for all districts.  Note that Pi(x) is negative for any districts who receive no immediate
benefits, i.e. for whom bi(x) = 0.  
A taxless finance scheme that does not provide benefits to all districts, ex ante, will have
a negative expected value to a majority of districts and will not be supported:
Pi(x) = bi(x) - tiC(x)(1-s) < 0    (œi where bi(x) = 0). 
Taxless finance does not work that way, however.  The assumption is that the project will
return money to the treasury, either in the form of dividends on the government’s stock or higher
revenues from land sales.  If M represents the potential profit of the enterprise to the
government, then the calculation of net benefits for each district becomes:
Pi(x) = bi(x) + tiM(s) - tiC(x)(1-s).
That is, each district expects its taxes to go down by tiM if the project is successful.  The critical
issue for districts who do not benefit directly from the canal, districts where bi(x) = 0, is whether
tiM(s) >< tiC(x)(1-s).  Taxless finance works politically because it promises every district that its
taxes will be lower if the project succeeds.
14 Of course, a major element in whether these13 Federal Impotence
profitable.  Governor Ford of Illinois, spoke directly to the ex ante expectations of the Illinois
politicians when he explained how the state got itself into difficulties in his message to the
legislature of December 8, 1842 “No scheme was so extravagant as not to appear plausible to
some.  The most wild expectations were made of the advantages of a system of internal
improvements, of the resources of the State to meet all expenditures, and of our final ability to
pay all indebtedness without taxation.  Mere possibilities appeared to be highly probable, and
probabilities wore the livery of certainty itself.”  Quoted in House Document, p. 1051.
schemes are perceived by citizens to have positive expected value depends on s, the probability
of success.
As with benefit taxation, taxless finance can simultaneously satisfy the majority
constraint and the exit constraint.
D. Many projects: Universalism or Something for Everyone. We emphasize the
financing of a single large project because of its relevance for state transportation investments in
the antebellum era. But the provision of small transportation projects was also relevant for
federal investment. Many antebellum expenditure policies fell into this category, rivers and
harbors projects, lighthouses, post offices, and roads.
One simple solution the legislature may chose, in contrast to building projects, is to
provide funds to lower jurisdictions (e.g., grants by the Congress to the states; grants by state
legislatures to counties or towns). Suppose that spending is allocated among districts by some
formula or rule of thumb (such as equal grants per capita).  Grant shares to individual districts
are given by gi
Pi(x) =  bi(gix) - tiC(x).
Further suppose that at an arbitrarily small amount of spending, ε, produces net benefits for all
districts:
Pi(ε) =  bi(giε) - tiC(ε) > 0   œi.14 Wallis and Weingast
15This subsection draws on the large literature on universalism, including Collie [1988],
Inman and Fitts [1990], Niou and Ordeshook [1985], Shepsle and Weingast [1981], Stein and
Bickers [1995], and Weingast [1979].
16 Both of these restrictions are easily generalized, for example, to projects that benefit a
small number of (perhaps contiguous) districts simultaneously.
Now the only problem facing the legislature is how much to spend.  If the exit constraint is
binding, expenditures will increase until the first district receives no net benefits.  If the exit
constraint can be eased by logrolling, then expenditures can increase further.
A simple virtue of something for everyone policies is that the same formula can often be
used to allocate taxation and expenditures.  For example, the constitution constrains the federal
government to allocate direct taxes according to population.  Direct taxes could be raised to
finance expenditures and funds could be divided between states according to population, land
area, miles of post roads, or some other easily measured attributes of states.  Something for
everyone policies often do not produce equal absolute of per capita grants for each state or
county.  The ti and gi need not be the same, they only need to be known.
Two other political forces push the legislature toward universal or something for
everyone solutions. Consider a legislature facing decisions over a range of projects, each with
concentrated local benefits and paid for through general taxation.
15 For simplicity, we assume
that each legislator has one proposed project; and that each project benefits her district and her
district alone.
16 Moreover, assume that each project is small relative to the budget, so that there is
no problem financing many or all at the same time. Let the benefits to each district from its15 Federal Impotence
17All of these assumptions can easily be generalized, so that the benefits, bi, costs, ci, and
tax share, ti, differ across districts.  As emphasized, we do not expect that these policies will
produce equal absolute or per capita spending across states or counties.
18Buchanan and Tulloch [1962] and Riker [1962] initiated the application of MWC’s to
legislatures.
project be b; that these are identical across districts, as are all the costs, c; and that each district
pays an equal tax share of 1/n of the total costs.
17
Legislators now consider bundles of projects. Given each legislator’s preferences, the
ideal bundle of projects is simple to characterize. Each legislator receives positive benefits only
if the project for her district is built. Building any or all other projects merely raises the district’s
taxes. So each legislator’s ideal policy is to build her project alone. Unfortunately any legislation
of that type will be defeated by a vote of n-1 to 1, with only the legislator benefitting voting in
favor. Legislators therefore have an incentive to create bundles of projects though logrolling. 
The literature has studied two natural types of bundles or logrolls. The first is a minimum
winning coalition (MWC) whereby (n+1)/2 legislators build their projects alone.
18 For those
legislators whose projects are built, this maximizes their net benefits. Enlarging the coalition
gains votes beyond the minimum needed. Yet, because it raises each coalition-members taxes
without increase their benefits, each is worse off. Of course, those legislators not included in the
MWC are worse off since their projects are not built, but they pay their share of the taxes to
finance the MWC’s projects. This implies that, once a given MWC forms, it is hard to overturn:
all members of the coalition benefit from this bundle; no bundle makes them better off; and they
are better off than if no projects are built.16 Wallis and Weingast
19One potential qualification of universalism that we ignore here is that universalism may
apply within majority party only, so that projects are not built in districts represented by the
minority party.
The problem is that there are too many such coalitions, and ex ante no legislator is
assured of being in the MWC so that their projects will be built. Thus, MWC politics involves
risk.
As an alternative, the legislature might institute and enforce a policy of universalism, the
notion that rather than play MWC politics, the legislature will simply build a project for each
district. Various “universalism theorems” show that, in comparison to the uncertainty of MWC
politics that build fewer projects than one for each district (but at least a majority), every
legislator is better off under universalism [Niou and Ordeshook 1985, Shepsle and Weingast
1981, Weingast 1979].
19 
Although the proofs of these results are a bit technical, the intuition is straightforward.
For simplicity, suppose that the benefits to each district, b, are identical, as are all the costs, c;
and that each district pays an equal tax share of 1/n of the total costs. Under the MWC politics,
legislators whose projects are built receive the benefits from their project, b, minus their share of
the tax costs of c(n+1)/2. As n becomes large, the size of the minimum winning coalition
approaches ½ of the legislature, so we will approximate the MWC tax share as one half; that is,
c/2. Further, since no one knows which MWC will form, we consider each equally likely. This
implies that a given legislator’s chances of being in the MWC that forms is on the order of one
half.
Thus, ex ante, each legislator’s expected value of the uncertain MWC politics is 1/2[b -
c/2] (when district i’s project is built)+ ½(-c/2) (when district i’s project is not built).17 Federal Impotence
Rearranging terms, the expected value of MWC politics is 1/2[b - c/2] + ½(-c/2) = (b-c)/2. In
contrast, under universalism, each district is assured its project, so the expected benefits are b-c.
Because b-c exceeds (b-c)/2 (as long as b-c > 0), all legislators prefer to institute and maintain a
set of institutions providing for universalism.
The universalism result shows that national expenditure programs can pass that provide
large numbers of small projects, located across the country.
A second result concerns parties. if the coalitional structure is known in advance – e.g., a
majority party or a region – then restricting universalism to that coalition provides its members
with greater individual benefits to the party’s members. Whether this happens depends on the
geographic distribution of the majority party. If it is geographically concentrated, so that the
minority is also geographically concentrated, financing the projects solely of majority party
members is likely to violate the exit constraint.
The main point is that, when the legislature seeks to build large numbers of small
projects, the tendency is toward universalism. We discussed two variants: with and without a
majority party. Without a majority party, universalism is likely to hold. With a majority party,
the oucome depends on geographic concentration. Without concentration, the majority party is
likely to build projects solely for its members; but with concentration, doing so violates the exit
constraint.  If the exit constraint binds, majority parties are constrained from excluding the
minority party.
E. Predictions about Legislative Choices. Governments could finance investments in
transportation in four ways.  Building a canal with limited geographic benefits was politically
infeasible using normal taxation.  Too many geographic interests obtained nothing except the18 Wallis and Weingast
20Benefit taxation and taxless finance were not mutually exclusive policies, a state could
use a little of each.  Both benefit taxation and taxless finance legislation were easier to pass when
there were large expected returns from the project.
prospect of higher taxes.  Building transportation infrastructure with something for everyone
policies was politically feasible, but fiscally impossible if the projects were large.  New York
could not afford to build an Erie Canal to every county.  Universalist or something for everyone
policies required equal, or close to equal, allocation of funds to every district.  Small projects
were politically feasible, but in the end did not develop an interregional transportation system.
A large canal investment could be made with benefit taxation or taxless finance.  Benefit
taxation worked very differently from taxless finance, however.  Benefit taxation required that
taxes be raised simultaneously with the onset of construction and borrowing.  Taxless finance
allowed taxpayers to assume a contingent tax liability, one that would only be assumed in the
event the project failed.  Both benefit taxation and taxless finance held out the promise of
significant benefits.
20 The constitutional restrictions placed on federal direct taxation made it
difficult, if not impossible, for the federal government to use benefit taxation.  
The following table summarizes the model’s predictions. The national government is
limited to taxless finance and universalist or something for everyone solutions. In contrast, states
can use benefit taxation. Although universalist solutions are feasible for states, these are less
attractive for major projects since this strategy necessarily involves building very small projects
of limited value. 19 Federal Impotence
Prediction: Federal State
Normal taxation No No
Universalism/
     Something for Everyone Yes Maybe
Benefit Taxation No Yes
Taxless Finance Yes Yes
We turn next to the policies used by federal and state governments to finance investment
between 1790 and 1860.
3. The Quantitative Pattern of Federal Internal Improvement Spending
The rough outlines of federal transportation policy are given in table 1 and in figure 1. Table 1
breaks down federal transportation expenditures by Presidential administration, both in
aggregate and per capita terms.  Figure 1 provides nominal federal transportation expenditures
per capita, per year from 1790 to 1860 as well as transportation expenditures as a share of total
federal expenditures.
The federal government spent money on transportation in every year in the early 19
th
century and every Congress considered transportation legislation.  As Figure 1 shows, nominal
expenditures rose slowly from 1790 through the 1810s, stalled during the early 1820s, rose
rapidly to a peak in 1837, dropped back sharply to their 1810s levels, then rose again in the
1850s.  The picture is one of very small expenditures with only one significant expansion during
the administration of Andrew Jackson.  Nominal per capita income in 1840 was roughly $100, so20 Wallis and Weingast
21The largest single federal project, aside from the Cumberland Road, was the Delaware
breakwater, which received $2.1 million in total.  The breakwater funding was appropriated
piecemeal, however, through rivers and harbors legislation.
federal transportation expenditures in their highest year were only .1 percent of national income,
and were typically on the order of .01 percent of national income.  The federal government
steadily spent a small amount of money on lighthouses, navigation improvements, and rural
roads.  Beyond that the federal government did very little.
Assessing the model’s predictions
Our theoretical framework identifies four ways the federal government could have used
to finance internal improvements.  Table 2 compares the model’s predictions about each method
of finance with the amounts actually spent by the federal government.   The main prediction is
that the federal government will not finance transportation projects with normal taxation or
benefit taxation, but will use taxless finance and universalism or something for everyone.  The
prediction is borne out.  In total, 97 percent of all federal transportation expenditures were
financed in using these two methods. 
The federal government used something for everyone schemes to finance 68 percent of
its infrastructure expenditures.  Rivers and Harbors bills were the main legislative vehicle for
funding these improvements. All the projects were small, and as was usually the case, individual
bills embodied logrolling within one piece of legislation.
21  The national government financed
another 28 percent of expenditures with taxless finance.  Most of the taxless finance schemes
used public land and are discussed in detail below.  21 Federal Impotence
We now consider the different federal policies related to financing internal improvements
and related programs.
Something for Everyone. Expenditures for lighthouses, roads, navigation, and general
rivers and harbors accounts for the lion’s share of expenditures made by the federal government
between 1790 and 1860: $41,435,000 out of $60,152,000.
Normal taxation. Financing transportation expenditures through normal taxation was
possible.  In the Monroe and Adams administration, Congress appropriated funds to purchase
stock in the Chesapeake and Delaware and Chesapeake and Ohio canals, as well as other smaller
canals.  Table 2 credits the $1,917,000 for these canals entirely to normal taxation; about three
percent of federal spending during the antebellum era. Normal taxation was possible, it just did
not amount to much.
Benefit Taxation. The Constitution prohibited benefit taxation, which was not used.
Taxless Finance. Taxless finance includes land grants and other projects.   Land grants
came in two forms.  One was land funds, in which a percentage of all revenue from federal land
sales in public land states to those states was dedicated to building transportation projects to and
within those state.  The Cumberland Road stretched from Washington D.C. to Illinois and was
the largest single federal project.  The Road was initiated by the Enabling Act for Ohio in 1802,
which set aside 2 percent of land sales revenues in Ohio to build roads to Ohio.  Similar funds
were established for other public land states (discussed in detail later).  The second form of
taxless finance using public lands were the direct grants of land to states like Indiana and Illinois
for support of their canals.   22 Wallis and Weingast
22Gates, [1968 and 1954].
In the table, land grants included the land given to states (valued at $1.25 an acre), the
revenues from the land funds created in state enabling acts transferred to the states, and the
expenditures on the Cumberland Road.  The motivation behind land funds and outright grants to
new states was explicitly fiscal.  Land grant schemes were predicated on the expectation that the
value of public land near the improvement would rise if transportation to an in the west
improved.  Land grant schemes illustrate the theoretical point that such ventures include a
contingent form of liability. Land grants turned out, ex post, to cost federal taxpayers lost land
revenues.  Transportation improvements did raise land values, but higher land values did not
translate into higher sale prices at federal land auctions after 1820.
22  
Congress also used taxless finance in other ventures. In 1791 and 1816, the federal
government chartered national banks.  The First Bank was chartered with a capital of $10 million
of which the government subscribed $2 million.  The Second Bank was chartered with a capital
of $35 million of which the government subscribed $7 million.  In both cases, the government
paid for its stock by issuing federal bonds to the banks (private subscribers could pay in specie or
federal bonds).  The banks paid dividends semi-annually, and the dividends paid to the federal
government for its stock always exceeded the interest payments on the bonds the federal
government used to purchase stock.  This illustrates the principle of taxless finance: no taxpayer
paid higher taxes because of the federal government investment in either Bank of the United
States.
In 1862, the Union Pacific Railroad combined two forms of taxless finance, land grants
and bond issues.  The company’s charter promised to give the railroad ten square miles of public23 Federal Impotence
23The land was given in alternating one-square mile sections, in a strip ten miles to either
side of the road.  Land was transferred to the company after it completed each 40 mile long
section of track.  Section 3, An Act to Aid the Construction of a Railroad, 37
th Congress, 2nd
Session, Chapter 120.
24 Section 5, An Act to Aid the Construction of a Railroad, 37
th Congress, 2nds Session,
Chapter 120.
25As noted earlier, we derive our $60 million estimate from Senate Executive Document
190, 42
nd  Congress, 1
st Session. The $450 million figure for state and local expenditure is a
estimate made by Goodrich, Government Promotion.  There is no breakdown on the total $450
million that we can analyze by financing type.
land for every mile of railroad the company completed.
23  In addition, the federal government
would give the company $16,000 in federal bonds for every mile of track completed.  The bonds
were an “ipso factor ... first mortgage on the whole line of the railroad and telegraph.”  The
company was responsible for servicing the bonds and repaying the principle.
24  Tax payers were
not supposed to pay to service the bonds, and the value of federal lands were supposed to
increase enough to outweigh the substantial acreage given to the railroad.  The twists and turns
of the Union Pacific are too complicated for us to follow.  Suffice it to say in the end the federal
government regretted that it had used taxless finance in this particular scheme.
4. State Investment in Internal Improvements
As noted, state investment in transportation outstripped federal investment by an order of
magnitude.  Goodrich estimates that state and local expenditures for transportation were a
combined $450 million before the Civil War, while federal government expenditures were $60
million (Table 1).
25  24 Wallis and Weingast
26This section of the paper is based on Wallis, “Constitutions, Corporations, and
Corruption.”  Debt outstanding in 1841 was $198 million, and we have included $13 million in
canal bonds issued by New York and Ohio that had been repaid by the early 1830s.
27States did, however, use formulas extensively to finance education expenditures and to
distribute road funds, but because these expenditures were not financed by debt issue they are
not included in the table. 
State budgetary data for the antebellum era are problematic and full accounting of state
expenditures by function is not possible [Wallis, 2000]. One way to characterize state financial
activity is to classify state debt outstanding in 1841 by type of financial method.  The $198
million outstanding in 1841 came just at the end of the dramatic expansion of state investment in
canals, railroads, and banks in the 1830s.  Since states faced the same political constraints as the
federal government -- a democratic legislature attempting to build geographically concentrated
projects to satisfy geographically diverse constituencies – we expect to see the same pattern of
outcomes with two differences.  One, states are not prevented from using benefit taxation.  Two,
states are so small, with many numerous subdivisions (counties), that something for everyone is
unlikely to be used to finance large projects, and small projects would be very small indeed.
Table 3 duplicates the structure of Table 2 for state government debt issued of
outstanding up to 1841.  We are able to classify state expenditures for $183 million of the $211
million in debt issued up to 1841.
26  Almost all of the state borrowing was for large projects; no
states borrowed to finance something for everyone schemes.
27 Per the model’s predictions, no
large state projects were financed by normal taxation.
States financed $53 million in canal investment through benefit taxation.  New York
included a provision allowing for a special “canal tax” in counties bordering the canal should
canal tolls and other fiscal resources of the canal fund prove insufficient to service canal bonds. 25 Federal Impotence
28See Wallis, 2003, for detailed consideration of the role that ad valorem property
taxation played in Indiana, and an over view of actions in the other states.
Property taxes were the major source of income for most state and local governments in
the early 19
th century, Wallis [2000 and 2001].  As Heckelman and Wallis [1997] show, late 19
th
century state and local investment in railroads made sense from a benefit tax point of view, even
though many railroads defaulted on their obligations.  State and local governments received
more in property tax revenues than they paid in debt service.  Much of the state and local
provision of transportation was generically, if not explicitly as in Indiana, benefit taxation.
29For state involvement in banking see Wallis, Sylla, and Legler [1994].  In the 1810s,
Massachusetts began taxing bank capital, well as investing in banks.  When the state realized the
capital tax was more remunerative than dividends, it sold its bank stock.  By the 1830s, more
than half of all Massachusetts state revenue came from the tax on bank stock.  Pennsylvania
receive roughly a quarter of its state revenues from bank dividends and bonus fees for bank
charters.
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois moved explicitly to ad valorem property when they adopted their
canal systems.
28
States financed another $53 million in bank investments using taxless finance.  Southern
states used several variants of the method used to finance the Second Bank of the United States. 
The states purchased stock in banks by issuing bonds that the banks were responsible for
servicing.  States had been successfully investing in banks in the United States since the 1780s.
29
The final $80 million were financed by taxless finance as well, only this borrowing was
primarily for transportation.  After the success of the Erie Canal, states like Pennsylvania and
Maryland began borrowing to build canals, but did not raise tax rates.  Instead, they paid current
interest on their bonds out of bond premiums or out of current borrowing.  Pennsylvania was the
worst state in this regard, and by 1841 it had the largest debt of any state, $33 million.  New
York began borrowing in the late 1830s to expand the Erie network, and did not raise taxes when
it did so.  When New York, 1817, and Ohio, 1826, began borrowing to build canals they used
benefit taxation.  When Pennsylvania and Maryland began borrowing in 1828 they utilized26 Wallis and Weingast
taxless finance, partly because it was clear by 1828 that the Erie Canal was returning profits to
New York.  When Indiana and Illinois began borrowing in 1837 they too used benefit taxation. 
But when New York and Massachusetts started borrowing in the late 1830s they used taxless
finance.  The use of taxless finance for transportation investments only arose after it appeared
that those investments would be profitable.
State investments were remarkable.  In 1836 and 1837, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan,
with a combined population of slightly more than 1,000,000 people, authorized the issue of over
$25 million in state bonds.  This debt exceeded the entire federal expenditures for transportation
in the Jackson and Van Buren administrations combined.  All of the state internal improvement
spending in the 1830s was financed by benefit taxation or taxless finance, just as the model
predicts.
5. Presidential Vetoes of Federal Legislation 
Column 2 of Table 2 reflects actual federal expenditures, which requires approval of both the
Congress and the president (subject to the veto override qualification). The table and our
discussion has left out legislation passed by Congress but vetoed by the president. As these
proposed significant expenditures, we examine them to see how they conform to the model’s
predictions.  First, we study the substance of the failed legislation, including analysis of the first
proposal for a systematic federal internal improvements policy. Second, we estimate the impact
of this legislation on federal expenditures. Because some of the legislation includes multi-year27 Federal Impotence
30Curtis Nettels [1924] analyzed the votes on 117 pieces of internal improvement
legislation considered by Congress between 1815 and 1829 alone.  
31The history of internal improvements is impressive. Goodrich [1960], Harrison [1954],
and Larson [2002] provide comprehensive accounts of federal policy.  The citations to these
three sources are given in this and the next section can be used to track the larger literature. For
the Gallatin plan see Goodrich [1960], 26-28 and Larson [2002], 58-63.
schemes for distributing funds from future revenues, we construct a counterfactual pattern of
federal expenditures assuming that the vetoed legislation had in fact become law.
Congress considered proposals for a variety of transportation projects every year, but
acted on them only episodically.
30   As documented, most of the money the federal government
spent was appropriated through small rivers and harbors bills.  On occasion, however, national
debates occurred resulting in legislation that, had it not been vetoed, would have given the
federal government a larger, permanent transportation policy.  These major episodes are listed in
Table 4.  The episodes underscore the historical inability of the federal government to implement
a larger program, and show that the logic of our approach helps understand the federal
government’s impotence.
The federal government passed on four opportunities to create a major transportation
policy. The first began with Jefferson’s second inaugural speech in 1805 when the President
encouraged Congress to consider spending the budget surplus on transportation projects. This led
Congress to commission the Gallatin plan, which in 1808 laid out a $20,000,000 program of
eight major national improvements. The Gallatin plan was derailed in part by Congress’s
inability to pass any of the pieces of the plan as individual projects and in part by financial costs
of Embargo of 1808 and the War of 1812. As our model predicts, Congress could not appropriate
money for large projects a one or two at a time.
3128 Wallis and Weingast
32Distribution bills typically divided money between the states on the basis of population
or on the basis of representation in Congress.  Since every state had at least 3 members of
Congress, allocation of funds on the basis of Congressional representation had a small state bias.
33For Madison’s veto see Goodrich [1960], 37-38; Larson [2002], 63-69.  
34For the Maysville veto see Goodrich [1960], 41-45 and Larson [2002], 182-186.
The second episode occurred when Congress decided in 1817 to allocate the $1,500,000
bonus paid by the Bank of the United States to a fund for internal improvement by proposing
first to divide these funds among the states on the basis of population, and second to contribute
future dividends from the Bank to the fund. In one of his last acts as President, Madison vetoed
the Bonus Bill.
32  Madison supported a constitutional amendment to allow the federal
government to support transportation, but would not approve grants for transportation without an
amendment.
33
The third episode encompassed Andrew Jackson’s first term and his decision to “oppose”
to internal improvements. Jackson vetoed the Maysville Road bill in 1830.
34 The Maysville road
lay entirely in Kentucky (and was the route that Jackson’s arch rival, Henry Clay, took home
from Washington) and was one of several small transportation bills passed by Congress that
year.  Jackson vetoed these bills on the grounds that the road did not serve a national purpose. 
Nonetheless, Jackson spent more on transportation than any President up to the Civil War, much
of it on projects similar to the Maysville road. We examine his well publicized opposition to
internal improvements later.
Then, in 1833, Clay negotiated an end the Nullification crisis, which included three bills:
the Force Bill, allowing Jackson the power to enforce national legislation, a tariff bill that
lowered rates, and a distribution bill allocating federal land sales revenues among the states on29 Federal Impotence
the basis of Congressional representation.  Jackson signed the Force Bill and the tariff bill, but
pocket vetoed the distribution bill, the last act of his first term [Larson 2002, 187-191.]
The final negative episode occurred when Henry Clay managed to include another
distribution provision in the Land Bill of 1841, automatically distributing public land sales
revenues to the states by Congressional representation.  The distribution scheme, however, was
tied to the tariff.  If tariff rates increased, distribution would be canceled. President Tyler signed
the Land Bill and shortly thereafter raised the tariff and suspended distribution.
Of the four major setbacks to a larger federal transportation program, only the failure to
enact the proposals of the Gallatin plan involved what we have termed normal taxation.  As
predicted, Congress could not pass such a plan. The other three setbacks involved Presidential
vetoes, or adverse action, of something for everyone plans.  What the president’s vetoed would
not have created a large integrated national transportation system, since all of the money in the
vetoed bills would have been spent by the states without any federal supervision.
How important were the vetoes?  The last column of Table 2 presents a simple
counterfactual allocation of the spending that would have occurred had legislation not been
vetoed.  All of the vetoed legislation would have resulted in something for
everyone/universalistic grants to states, and significantly, the main conclusion that we draw from
Table 2, that the federal government could not use normal taxation or benefit taxation to finance
transportation expenditures, remains unchanged by the counterfactual.  
The table assumes that the entire $1,500,000 bonus paid by the Second Bank of the
United States as well as dividends of $700,000 a year (a 10 percent return on the government’s
$7,000,000 investment) for twenty years totaling $14,000,000 would have been distributed to the30 Wallis and Weingast
35In 1836, Congress passed and Jackson signed a bill distributing the federal surplus
revenue to the states.  It was to be done in four quarterly installments, totaling $36 million over
the course of 1837.  The Panic of 1837 disordered federal finances, and the fourth installment
was never made.  See Bourne [1885].
states.  Had interest on the federal bonds used to purchase the stock been netted out, this figure
would have been reduced to roughly $7,000,000. 
The impact of the distribution bills of 1833 and 1841 are estimated by taking half of
actual gross land sales revenues between 1834 and 1841 (for the 1833 bill) and half of actual
gross land sales revenues from 1842 and 1860 (for the 1841 bill).  Both bills would have netted
out the costs of the land office before grants were made to the states. By coincidence, nominal
land sales revenues between 1833 and 1841 are the same as nominal revenues between 1841 and
1860 (a testament to the unusual sales in 1835 and 1836).  One needs to be careful with this
counterfactual, however.  If the distribution bill of 1833 had not been vetoed, then the land sales
revenues that accumulated in the federal treasury and were distributed in 1837 would never have
accumulated.
35  Since $27,000,000 was actually distributed to the states, the $42,000,000 figure
for the 1833 act requires adjusting to $15,000,000 if we take into account the surplus distribution
that did occur.
The impact of the vetoed legislation is large in absolute terms: federal expenditures on
transportation would have been two and-a-half to three times higher (by $97,500,000 or
$70,500,00 depending on how the surplus revenue is treated.)  Of course, none of this money
would have been spent by the federal government, it all would have been spent by the states. 
There still would not have been a federal system of internal improvements.  Our prediction that
the federal government will use something for everyone/universalistic expenditure programs still31 Federal Impotence
36Goodrich, [1960], p. 40.  See Malone, Opening the West, and Senate Executive
Document 196, 47
th Congress, 1
st Session, “Statement of the Appropriations and Expenditures
for Public Buildings, Rivers and Harbors, Forts, Arsenals, Armories and Other Public Works
from March 4, 1789 to June 30, 1882.”  Malone’s book analyzes the information in the Report. 
He comes up with a total of $54 million on transportation expenditures.  Our calculations total
$60 million.  We have chosen to go with our total and have been unable to determine where
Malone derived his $54 million total from.
stands as verified.  Even with the addition of $70,000,000 in federal grants to the state, federal
expenditures would have been less than a third of state and local governments between 1790 and
1860.
6. Antebellum Federal Internal Improvement Spending
The federal government did have accomplishments.  The first was funding lighthouse
construction, beginning with the first Congress in 1790.  Funding small, geographically diverse
projects continued on an annual basis, with the addition of roads in 1802, rivers in 1824, harbors
in 1824, and the first “rivers and harbors” bill in 1826.
36  Small omnibus lighthouse, roads, and
rivers and harbor legislation account for $41 million of the $60 million in federal transportation
expenditures (Table 2).  Funding for universal collections of transportation projects was
continuous and, with the exception of Jackson’s 1830s vetoes, never frustrated by the president. 
The second important federal initiative, and the second most important in fiscal terms,
began in 1802 with the enabling act admitting Ohio to statehood.   This act set aside five percent
of land sales revenues, after deducting expenses, for the “building of public roads” to and within32 Wallis and Weingast
37The arrangement was an explicit deal in which Congress agreed to build roads to and
within Ohio in return for Ohio’s promise not to tax federal lands for five years after they were
sold to private individuals. Larson [2002], 54-55.
38Goodrich, 1960, pp. 24-26.
39Terms of the other enabling acts varied slightly, but contained the same principles. See
Gates [1968].
the state of Ohio.
37  The Ohio legislature asked that three percent of the funds be expended inside
Ohio and Congress agreed.  The “two percent” fund for roads leading to Ohio began to
accumulate, and in 1805 Congress authorized a survey of the route for the National, or
Cumberland, Road.  Construction began in 1808, and continued into the 1850s, in the end
accounting for $7,000,000 in expenditures.
38 
The Ohio enabling act is remarkable for several reasons.  First, similar provisions were
included in the enabling acts of every state that entered the Union after Ohio.
39  Second, the act
clearly authorized the federal government to redistribute funds from one revenue source, sale of
public lands, to another expenditure purpose, public roads (that were not post roads which were
explicitly authorized in the Constitution].  Third, the act authorized the construction of public
roads within one state, with the consent of the state.  In other words, the Ohio enabling act put
policies into place that were repeated in the enabling act of every subsequent state by Congress
and signed into law by Presidents.  Yet Madison, who signed state enabling acts with these
provisions, and Jackson vetoed bills containing exactly the same procedures and policies on the
grounds that the bills were unconstitutional.  Madison and Jackson did not use the term
“unconstitutional” in a consistent way.
The third positive accomplishment developed in the administrations of Monroe and John
Quincy Adams.  Although a supporter of internal improvements, Monroe vetoed a bill33 Federal Impotence
40 For Monroe’s veto message see  Richardson, Papers and Addresses of the Presidents,
“Veto Message,” May 4, 1822, pp. 711-12.  For his message suggesting that truly national
projects should be supported see Richardson, Papers and Addresses of the Presidents, “Seventh
Annual Message,” December 2, 1823, p. 785.  For the Monroe and Adams administrations see
Goodrich [1960], 38-40 and Larson [2002], 135-173.
authorizing the construction and maintenance of toll booths on the Cumberland Road in 1822.
On the same day that he issued his veto, he seemed to slam the door on federal internal
improvements in a long message to Congress arguing that federal improvements required a
Constitutional amendment.  But then, reversing his position, Monroe indicated in his seventh
annual message to Congress (December 1823] that he would support projects of “a national
object.”
40 In 1824, Congress passed and Monroe signed a General Survey bill authorizing the
Army Corp of Engineers to begin surveying possible transportation routes to build an integrated
national system.  On his last day in office in 1825, Monroe authorized federal subscription of
$300,000 in the stock of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal.  His successor, John Quincy
Adams, laid out an ambitious agenda of federal expansion in his first message to Congress. 
Adams vigorously supported transportation projects, and by the end of his administration the
federal government had subscribed $1,921,000 to the stock of the Chesapeake and Delaware
canal, the Louisville and Portland Canal, the Dismal Swamp Canal, and the Chesapeake and
Ohio (C&O) canal.
Federal stock subscription was a form of normal taxation.  Regular federal revenues,
mainly from tariffs, were used to purchase stock (in the 1820s it was surplus revenues, no new
taxes were levied or raised).  Adams was demonstrably willing to sign bills authorizing normal
taxation, but despite active presidential support, Congress could not come up with an integrated34 Wallis and Weingast
plan for a national transportation system. All four of the stock subscriptions were in projects
originally identified in the Gallatin report in 1808. 
Congress instead pressed ahead with universal spending and a version of taxless finance. 
The first rivers and harbors bill passed in 1826. In the same year, Congress approved a series of
land grants to individual states for the support of specific projects in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and
Alabama.  These land grants conferred to states the opportunity to sell public lands and use the
revenues to support projects.  Congress explicitly considered this a form of taxless finance. 
Even though the federal treasury gave up land revenues on the granted lands, Congress fully
expected that transportation improvements would raise the value of adjacent lands.  Grants were
made in alternating strips on either side of the transit line, federal lands alternating with state
lands (this was the origin of the land grant system used to finance the intercontinental railroads). 
The striking outcome of the Monroe and Adams presidencies is the small amount of funding
forthcoming from Congress, less than $2 million of funds from normal tax revenues.  Something
for everyone and taxless finance were still the order of the day.
Jackson is credited with ending federal support for transportation.  As Goodrich put it,
“the Era of National Projects may be thought of as ending in his administration.” [Goodrich
1960, p. 42.]   But as Table 1 makes clear, Jackson was not against federal support for
transportation in general, and his administration spent more money on transportation than any
other before the Civil War.  Although Jackson’s expenditures were matched in nominal terms by
administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, he spent a far larger percentage of federal expenditures
on transportation than any other president.  What Jackson killed when he vetoed the Maysville
road was the idea of an integrated national system of internal improvements.  This goal is what35 Federal Impotence
Monroe started towards in the General Survey Bill in 1824 and what Adams hoped to
accomplish. 
Jackson had the luck to be in office during the largest public land boom in the nation’s
history, 32 million acres of land were sold in 1835 and 1836, generating $40 million in revenue
alone when expenditures in 1830 were only $15 million.  While he opposed a integrated
nationally financed system of internal improvements, Jackson had no problem with approving
expenditures for light house, road, and rivers and harbors legislation that Congressmen loved and
had been passing since the 1790s.  Political historians have long appreciated Jackson’s creation
of a political party mechanism that enforced party loyalty in the Congress.  The dramatic
expansion in internal improvement funding surely helped Jackson and his party leaders to
assemble and maintain this coalition. Jackson’s handpicked successor, Van Buren, had the
unfortunate luck to come into office just as the economy headed into six years of economic
upheaval and depression.
7. Extensions: The 20
th Century Growth of the Federal Government 
Given our thesis about the impotence of the antebellum federal government, a natural question to
ask next is why did the federal government grow to be so large in the twentieth century?  A
detailed explanation is beyond the scope of this paper, but our model sheds lights on this
question. The key historical episodes occurred in the Civil War and New Deal, but part of the
power of the federal government still lies in its ability to pursue something for everyone policies.36 Wallis and Weingast
The first important difference between the antebellum and postbellum years is that the
Civil War dramatically altered the exit constraint.  Secession from the Union became far more
costly, so the threat of exit became much less serious.  During the Civil War, Southern secession
immediately altered the section balance and geographic competition within Congress.  Southern
absence allowed Northern representatives to take action several measures previously held up by
sectional differences, including the intercontinental railroad and the Homestead Act.
The federal government gradually increased the size and scope of its operations in the
late 19
th and early 20
th century, but the federal government did not grow relative to state and
local governments until the New Deal [Wallis 2000]. The Great Depression triggered a
substantial increase in the size of government at all levels, but particularly at the federal level. 
Increased expenditures on various relief programs comprised the bulk of the relative increase in
federal expenditures [Wallis 1984].  
The expansion of relief and infrastructure spending combined with the increase in
economic regulation to dramatically increase the possibilities for legislative exchange and log
rolling within Congress: simultaneously expanding the scope of government in many areas
allowed the Democratic party to engineer a more complex set of political exchanges
underpinning the New Deal whereby all Democrats gained from the new set of programs. The
model shows that adding a single new program with concentrated benefits is very difficult. Yet
adding a large set of new programs with different incidences allows members of Congress to
support a package of programs that make them better off.
A second factor emphasized by our model also promoted federal expansion namely, the
power of universalism or something for everyone. The largest federal transportation program is37 Federal Impotence
41Medicare, the other big national entitlement, also provides something for everyone in
the sense the program provides benefits for individuals in every state.
the interstate highway system.  Federal grants for highway construction began in 1916. To this
day, highway grants reflects a formula-driven program that provides something for everyone
[Johnson and Libecap, 2003].  Highway grants are a classic case of universalism: every state
shares in the expenditures. New Dealers also funded welfare expenditures in a something for
everyone form. The Social Security Act passed in 1935 created a multi-dimensional relief
structure. Old age insurance (Social Security) was funded through individual accounts, the
ultimate in something for everyone.  Categorical relief programs – Aid to the Blind, Old Age
Assistance, and Aid to Dependent Children – were financed with straight matching grants
depending on state spending per case.  Unemployment Insurance was funded through a federal
payroll tax, but administered by state governments. All these programs provide funds to
categories of individuals who reside in every state and every congressional district. In essence,
all of the money to be spent under the Social Security Act, by the far the act with the largest
fiscal implications in the nation’s history, was allocated by something for everyone type
formulas.
41 Even in the 20
th century, therefore, the federal government funds a great many
expenditures through something for everyone programs.
In combination, then, the Civil War relaxed the exit constraint and the New Deal
provided the opportunity for a new set of political exchanges underpinning a dramatic expansion
in the federal government. 38 Wallis and Weingast
8. Conclusions 
The central puzzle of this paper concerns why the states and not the federal government were the
primary locus of the promotion of economic development during the antebellum era.  States
spent an order of magnitude more than the national government in providing various forms of
economic infrastructure, notably, roads, canals, railroads, lighthouses, harbors, and banks. We
demonstrate that while these programs were popular with the voters, states and not the federal
government provided these public goods. Moreover, we show that the federal government
regularly sought to promote them.  While states financed huge transportation projects, the federal
government’s aggregate spending was not only much smaller, but typically focused on small
projects, such as building lighthouses and dredging harbors, rather than on large and arguably
more valuable projects. 
To solve this puzzle, we provide a model of political choice based on the theory of
legislative choice. The model yields several conclusions concerning the financing of large
projects – where large projects are defined as those whose financial commitments are so large
that only one or two can be built at once. First, legislatures have difficulty voting to fund large
projects because the benefits are typically concentrated, while the expenses are spread over all
through general taxation. This means that a majority of districts receive no direct benefits from
the project and yet pay their share of the costs. Because their net benefits are negative, these
districts oppose building the project.
Second, benefit taxation affords a potential way out of this problem. Benefit taxation sets
a district’s taxes in proportion to the benefits it receives, so that districts with the most benefits39 Federal Impotence
pay the most taxes while districts receiving no benefits pay no taxes. Projects with perceived
positive expected values can be financed in this way because there is no natural opposition.
Third, majority rule legislatures easily finance large packages of small projects; that is,
simultaneously building many small projects in most or nearly all districts. This includes the
standard rivers and harbors projects, lighthouses, post offices and postal roads. In contrast to a
single large project, large packages of small projects gain majority support by including projects
for most or nearly all districts,.
The final piece of the puzzle is institutional: The United States Constitution created an
asymmetry between the national and the state governments with respect to taxation. Although
states were free to use benefit taxation, the Constitution prohibited the national government from
using it: the Constitution requires that all direct taxes be in proportion to the federal ratio.
These results help explain the pattern of governmental expenditure in antebellum
America. First, the huge demand for market-enhancing public goods promoting economic
development through infrastructure was quite popular with national and state voters. Yet the
Constitutional asymmetry on benefit taxation implied that states were able to use this financial
mechanism to create majorities in favor of large projects, whereas the federal government was
not. Although proposals for promoting systematic, interregional infrastructure development
regularly came to the Congress, few passed. The national government did, however, spend a
considerable amount funding large collections of small projects, such as lighthouses, postal
roads, and dredging harbors.
Three implications of our approach provide insights into the growth of the federal
government in the twentieth century. First, the Civil War dramatically reduced the importance of40 Wallis and Weingast
the exit constraint, allowing concentration of benefits by a majority. Second, although the model
shows that it is difficult to add a single new program with concentrated benefits, it is possible to
add a large set of programs as long as the incidence of the set makes a majority better off. Third,
a great many of the New Deal programs were based on universalism or something for everyone.
The New Deal combined all these features to help underpin the great expansion of the federal
government.
An additional benefit of our approach concerns the issue of federalism. A major concern
in the literature on federalism concerns the question of what provides for federalism’s stability.
As Riker [1964] observed, most federal states fail, either by disintegrating or by becoming
centralized ones. In order for federalism to be stable, it must be self-enforcing in the sense that
government both national and subnational government officials have the incentive to abide by
the restraints of federalism [de Figueiredo and Weingast, 2005].
A major issue in the economic and political history of the early nineteenth century is why
the national government was relatively small in comparison to the states. Our approach shows
that the Constitution provided a structure that allowed states to finance infrastructure projects but
not the national government. This effect helped keep the national government smaller and the
states larger. Were the national government able to use benefit taxation, it would have
undoubtedly been far larger and the state governments far smaller.41 Federal Impotence
References
Aldrich, John H. 1995., Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in
America. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)
Bourne, Edward G., The History of the Surplus Revenue Act of 1837. (Original published in
1885.  Reprinted by Burt Franklin: New York, 1968.)
Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock, Calculus of Consent. (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1962.)
Callender, Guy Stevens, “The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. XVII, no. 1, (1902), 111-162.
Collie, Melissa, “The Legislature and Distributive Policymaking in Formal Perspective.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly.  12 (1988), 427-58.
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
de Figueiredo, Rui, and Barry R. Weingast, “Self-Enforcing Federalism,” J. of Law, Economics
and Organization, 2005.
Gates, Paul Wallace,  History of Public Land Law Development. (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1968.)
Gates, Paul Wallace, “The Railroad Land-Grant Legend.” Journal of Economic History, 14
(Spring 1954), 143-46.
Goodrich, Carter,  Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1960.)
Harrison, Joseph Hobson, The Internal Improvement Issue in the Politics of the Union, 1783-
1825. (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1954.)
Heckelman, Jac and John Joseph Wallis, “Railroads and Property Taxes” Explorations in
Economic History, 34, (January  1997), 77-99.
Hendrickson, David C.,  Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding. (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2003.)42 Wallis and Weingast
Hinich, Melvin J., and Micahel C. Munger Analytical Politics. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.)
Inman, Robert P., “Federal Assistance and Local Services in the United States: The Evolution of
a New Federalist Fiscal Order,” in Harvey S. Rosen, ed., Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative
Studies. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.).
Inman, Robert P., and Michael Fitts, “Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the
U.S. Historical Record.” J. of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 6 (1990), 79-132.
Johnson, Ronald N. Gary D. Libecap, “Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority
Rule.,” Economic Inquiry, 41 (April 2003), 193 - 207.
Krehbiel, Keith, “Where’s the Party?” British J. of Political Science (1994).
Larson, John Lauritz. Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular
Government in the Early United States. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2001).
Legler, John B., Richard E. Sylla, and John Joseph Wallis, "U.S. City Finances and the Growth
of Government, 1850-1902," Journal of Economic History, 48, (June 1988), 347-356.
Malone, Laurence J., Opening the West: Federal Internal Improvements Before 1860. 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998.)
Nettels, Curtis, “The Mississippi Valley and the Constitution, 1815-1829.” The Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, 11 (December, 1924), 332-357.
Niou, Emerson, and Peter Ordeshook, “Universalism in Congress.” American J. of Political
Science, 298 (1985), 246-90.
North, Douglass C., The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. (New York: Norton,
1966).
Polsby, Nelson W., How Congress Evolves:  Social Bases of Institutional Change.  (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
Richardson, James D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (Washington: Bureau of National
Literature, 1897).
Rohde, David. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991).Federal Impotence
43
Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1962).
Riker, William H., Federalism: Origins, Operations, and Significance. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1964.)
Schickler, Eric., Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S.
Congress. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, "The State Rights Fetish," in his, New Viewpoints in American
History. (New York: Macmillan,1922).
Shepsle, Kenneth A., “The Textbook Congress.” 1989.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics. (New York: W.W. Norton,
1997).
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast, "Political Solutions to Market Problems,"
American Political Science Review, 78 (June 1984), 417-34.
Stein, Robert M., and Kenneth N. Bickers, Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and
American Democracy. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Stewart, Charles III, Analyzing Congress. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
Sylla, Richard, John B. Legler, and John Joseph Wallis,  "Banks and State Public Finance in the
New Republic."  Journal of Economic History, 47 (1987), 391-403.
Taylor, George Rogers. The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860. (New York: Harper, 1968). 
Wallis, John Joseph, Richard Sylla and John Legler, “The Interaction of Taxation and Regulation
in Nineteenth Century Banking.” In Goldin and Libecap, eds. The Regulated Economy: A
Historical Approach to Political Economy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), 121-144.
Wallis, John Joseph, "The Birth of the Old Federalism: Financing the New Deal," Journal of Economic
History, 44 (March 1984) 139-159.
Wallis, John Joseph, “The Property Tax as a Coordination Device: Financing Indiana’s
Mammoth System of Internal Improvements.” Explorations in Economic History, 40
(July 2003) 223-250.Wallis and Weingast
44
Wallis, John Joseph, “American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to 1990,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 14 (January, 2000), 61-82.
Wallis, John Joseph, “History of the Property Tax,” in Property Taxation and Local Government
Finance, Wallace E. Oates, ed., (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute, 2001).
Wallis, John Joseph, “Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: Constitutional Change in
American States, 1842-1852.” Journal of Economic History, 65 (March 2005), 211-256.
Weingast, Barry R., "A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms," American
Journal of Political Science 24 (1979), 245-262.
Weingast, Barry R., and William H. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress: Or
Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets” Journal of Political
Economy. 96 (1988), 132-63.
Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and  Christopher Johnsen. "The Political Economy of
Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of
Political Economy, 89 (August 1981), 642-664.




Federal Spending on Internal Improvements
by President
Administration Dates Aggregate Per Capita Share of all
Federal Expenditure
Washington 1788-1796 $229,968 $0.009  0.74%
J Adams 1797-1800 $303,896  $0.015  0.94%
Jefferson 1801-1808 $994,678 $0.020  1.36%
Madison 1809-1816 $2,066,910 $0.033  1.52%
Monroe 1817-1824 $2,997,914 $0.042  1.57%
J Q Adams 1825-1828 $3,861,265  $0.083  5.89%
Jackson 1829-1836 $14,452,376 $0.129  9.51%
Van Buren 1837-1840 $7,528,064  $0.118  5.62%
Harrison/Tyler 1841-1844 $3,068,753 $0.042  3.47%
Polk 1845-1848 $3,197,824 $0.038  2.29%
Taylor/Fillmore 1849-1852 $4,071,541 $0.043  2.31%
Pierce 1853-1856 $9,642,863 $0.091  4.33%
Buchanan 1857-1860 $9,515,536 $0.080  3.51%
Total $61,931,588.728 Wallis and Weingast
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Table 2
Model Predictions and Federal Spending Patterns
Method Prediction Amount Cases Veto
Counterfactual
Normal Taxation No $1,917,000  Chesapeake and
Delaware
Chesapeake and Ohio







  Bonus Bill $1,500,00
     Dividends $14,000,000
1833 Distribution Bill $42,000,000
1841 Distribution Bill $42,000,000
Benefit Taxation No 0 
Taxless Finance Yes $4,750,000  Public Land Funds
Big Projects $6,800,000  Cumberland Road
$5,250,000 Land  Grant
Equivalents
   (4,000,000 acres)
Total $60,152,000 
Other Taxless Finance
$2,000,000  First Bank of the
United States
$7,000,000  Second Bank of the
United States
$30,000,000  Union Pacific RailroadFederal Impotence
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Table 3
Model Predictions and State Spending Patterns
Method Prediction Amount Cases
Normal Taxation No 0 
Something for Everyone Yes, but Unlikely 0  Some education and roads
Projects are too 
small
Benefit Taxation Yes $53,000,000 Canals and RR, in NY, OH, IN, IL
Taxless Finance Yes $53,000,000 Banks in South
$80,000,000 Transportation in North
Total $186,000,000
Source: Wallis, “Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption.”Wallis and Weingast
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Table 4
Major Episodes in Federal Transportation Policy
Year Program Result
1802 Ohio Enabling Act allocates 5 percent of land
sales in Ohio to building transportation to and
within Ohio. The federal portion, 2 percent,
forms the basis of the fund for constructing the
Cumberland Road
Required 2% of land sales in Ohio to
be dedicated to building a road to
Ohio.  Eventually resulted in
$8,000,000 in expenditures on the
Cumberland Road
1805 Jefferson’s Second Inaugural Speech
Led to Gallatin Plan in 1808
Relatively little federal action.  Most
of Gallatin’s proposed projects were
built by the states
1817 Bonus Bill:
Distribute the $1,500,000 charter bonus and
subsequent dividends from the Bank of the
United States to the States on the basis of
Congressional representation
Vetoed by President Madison
1821 - 
1825
Monroe vetoes bill to repair Cumberland Road
toll booths, but then promotes and signs
General Survey Bill.
The survey bill results in surveys, and




JQ Adams supports a larger federal system in
his inaugural speech.
Congress debates plans, and
implements several large land grant
projects and four stock purchases.
1830 Congress funds the Maysville road along with
several other small road projects.
Jackson vetoes the Maysville Road
bill.
1832 Congress passes a distribution bill, allocating a
portion of federal land sales revenues to the
states as part of Clay’s compromise package to
end the Nullification crisis.
Jackson signs the force bill and the
tariff bill, but pocket vetoes the
distribution bill.
1836 Congress votes to distribute federal surplus
revenues to the states on the basis of
Congressional representation, but not to tie the
distribution to transportation.
Jackson signs the bill and $24,000,000
is distributed to states in 1837.  The
fourth installment is never made.
1841 Congress includes a provision to distribute a
portion of federal land sales to the states in the
Land Bill of 1841, but includes a proviso that
ties distribution to the level of the tariff.
Tyler raises tariffs and suspends
distribution.Federal Impotence
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